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24.09.2010 | Windjet A319 | LICJ (Palermo) | Landeunfall


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Ein A319 (kein A300 wie die Agenturen berichten) der Windjet ist gestern Abend in Palermo neben der Piste aufgesetzt. Das Flugzeug wurde evakuiert und es gab nur leichte Verletzungen.

 

Quellen:

Tagesanzeiger: "Flugzeug landete abseits der Piste" (inkl. Bilder)

Avherald

 

Gruss,

Dominik

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Palermo ist ein spezieller Airport, sehr schoen gelegen in einer wunderschonen Landschaft. Bei Suedwind wird der Platz jedoch zum Horror. Windshear ist tatsaechlich extrem und ist extrem gefaehrlich. Ich erinnerer mich an einen Fall in unserer Airline wo der Flieger praktisch ueber der Piste von Shear erfasst wurde und durchstarten musste. Der Platz war danach den ganzen Vormittag geschlossen bist der Wind sich veringerte.

 

Windjet ist jedoch eine anderer sache, die Airline hat innerhalb der italienischen Airline Industrie einen extrem schlechten Ruf. Schlechte Bezahlung, Training, Vetternwirtschaft. Viele Incidents.

 

So wie es aussieht wurde die Maschine von Windshear erfasst und die Crew hat nicht oder zu spaet reagiert, die Untersuchung wird es zeigen.

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  • 4 Jahre später...

Der Final Report ist draussen, und wurde beim AvHerald übersetzt und ausgeführt. So wie es aussieht war Windshear nicht das Problem, sondern das Ignorieren der Minima und darauf folgend das bewusste zu tiefe Anfliegen, vielleicht wegen Herbeizug falscher visueller Referenzen bei schlechter Sicht:

 

 

The fact, that the aircraft contacted ground 367 meters before the runway threshold, has been the result of the decision of the crew to continue the instrument approach without sufficient visual reference to complete the non-precision landing maneouver.

 

 

The existance of adverse weather, characterized by the presence of extreme rainfall, which significantly reduced the overall visibility.

 

 

 

 

The decrease of the light beam performance of the semi flush threshold lights in extreme rain; the only bright reference for the crew were the cross bars of the simple approach lighting system, which were probably mistaken for the threshold of the runway.

 

 

 

 

Wetter war das eine, aber die Performance der Crew und der Airport Services waren auch alles andere als vorbildlich. 

 

http://www.avherald.com/h?article=4315b792%2F0009&opt=0

 

Einige Dinge, die man sich besonders auf der Zunge zergehen lassen sollte (eigentlich könnte man da gleich den ganzen Report zitieren...).

Hervorhebungen durch mich. 

 

 

 

The cockpit voice recorder further revealed that the descent and approach briefings did not take place. It even appears that the commander, who had done 94 approach to Palermo in the last 6 months, did not have the related approach plates in front of him feeling the maps were not needed because of familiarity with the aerodrome.

 

 

when the aircraft was cleared to descend to 1500 feet and for the VOR approach Z runway 07, an intense exchange of strong views arose between commander in charge and first officer about technical issues of controlling an aircraft in turbulence with the commander instructing the first officer to reduce speed for passenger comfort, the commander adopting non-standard phraseology and maintaining an attitude, emplyoing strong criticism of the approach chosen by the first officer and employing biting sarcasm, "that could have had a highly negative impact on interpersonal and cognitive skills of the copilot." 

 

 

 

The ANSV analysed that following the "100 feet above" a situation of sterile cockpit arose, the commander was about performing to standard operating procedures, however, by inquiring "Do you see" (resulting in reply "I do not" as the first officer had not yet even begun to scan for visual references being purely on instruments waiting for the "continue" or "minimums" call by the pilot monitoring ) indicated he was not fully aware of the roles of the pilots.

 

 

 

After the automated call "Minimums" the commander called out "Continue, Continue" clearly providing the intention to continue the approach, however in violation of procedures and rules. The first officer, upon hearing the call "Minimums", automated or not, was required to initiate the go-around and call for "Go-Around Flaps". In post accident interviews the first officer reasoned however in view of his lack of assertiveness that he trusted the commander had acquired visual reference and he, too, would acquire visual reference. About 20 seconds later, at 480 feet AGL, he did acquire visual reference. 

 

 

 

Immediately afterwards the captain announced "I have control", disconnected the autopilot and continued manually, applying several large left and down inputs resulting in a maximum left bank angle of 16 degrees and a pitch attitude of 2 degrees nose down. Descending through 400 feet AGL the aircraft reached 1360 fpm rate of descent, which then remained constant until about 240 feet AGL, by then the first officer announced "I see four reds" referring to the PAPIs.

 

 

 

 

 

The ANSV had the EGPWS units sent to the manufacturer for further analysis of why, despite the rate of descent suggesting a "SINK RATE" call should have occurred, did not occur. The manufacturer found that the rate of descent bordered the Mode 1 criteria, the filters for nuisance calls prevented the actual call out

 

 

 

Doch es wird noch besser, denn nach dem Aufschlag kommt auch Palermo Airport ins Spiel:

 

 

 

 

30 seconds after first impact with the embankment 367 meters short of the runway threshold the Emergency Locator Transmitter activated (according to its built in stand by phase of 30 seconds), the ELT signal was received at Palermo Tower. At that point the aircraft had already come to a stop and evacuation was initiated. After all passengers were evacuated, the commander in charge also left the aircraft, the off duty commander phoned the tower and gave an approximate position of their aircraft. The passengers in the meantime, seeing lights in the distance, proceeded in the direction of those lights, a number of them arriving at the fire house and being assisted by staff there, another number arriving at the terminal and were assisted at the arrival hall.

 

 

tower provided a first estimate of the aircraft position only 5 minutes and 37 seconds after the activation of the "state of emergency", at which point it became clear to emergency crews that an actual accident had happened.

 

 

 

 

However, the poor quality of the communication on the frequency assigned to communication between tower and emergency vehicles at approximately 440 MHz, which rendered communication mostly incomprehensible contributed to further delays so that the first emergency vehicles arrived at the aircraft only 22 minutes and 5 seconds after the ELT activated.

 

 

 

The poor quality of communication, the excitement of staff on frequency as well as the unfamiliarity of fire crews with phraseology used by tower further contributed to the lack of overview over the rescue phase by emergency crews which led e.g. to the belief that the aircraft had gone off the runway into the sea, resources therefore being dedicated to drive along the perimeter road of the aerodrome to look for the aircraft.

 

 

 

The ANSV stated that none of the staff on the ground ever understood there had an accident occurred, even after 118 passengers arrived at the fire house and the terminal it did not occur to staff that an accident had happened and the airport emergency plan was still not implemented according to the accident category. Hence, for example, the passengers were all taken to the arrival hall of the airport, where they mixed with passengers from other flights, instead of the designated VIP room for post accident assistance (depriving emergency services to account for all occupants, some of whom had already left the airport and gone home).

 

 

 

In addition, due to accident emergency plan not being put into action, the west gate of the aerodrome remained closed. Local Emergency services, ambulances and local fire engines from the city of Palermo, could not enter the aerodrome and remained outside the aerodrome at the west gate.

 

 

 

 

Huiuiuiui....

 

 

Tis

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Ein Schettino der Lüfte.

 

Die Irrfahrt der Feuerwehr über den Flughafen erinnert stark an die Feuerwehr im Film "Die tollkühnen Männer in ihren fliegenden Kisten". :) Die Karte im Avherald-Bericht ist für mich das Highlight in dem ganzen Bericht.

 

irrfahrt_palermo.jpg

 

Ciao

Friedrich

Bearbeitet von F-LSZH
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